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Introduction 
This article focuses primarily on efforts to improve management control systems and 
processes, including budgeting, accounting and reporting, within the context of a 
responsibility framework in the United States and Italy. In public management theory, 
management control is assumed to be a process for motivating and inspiring people to 
perform more effectively in the context of working in complex organizations (Jones and 
Thompson, 1999: 130). From this perspective, management control attempts to motivate 
public managers to serve the policies and purposes of the organizations to which they 
belong, and to meet the demands and preferences of the citizens and customers they 
serve. Additionally, management control is a means for correcting performance 
problems and including inefficient use of resources. Among the initiatives taken to 
implement management control systems and to control costs is the design of new or 
reconfigured budgeting, accounting and reporting systems. One approach to redesign is 
responsibility budgeting and accounting, now widely practiced internationally.  
The discipline of management control is based on the presumption that managerial and 
all behavior of individuals working in organizations is largely self-interested, also a 
tenet in economics. Goals of management control include increased efficiency and 
effectiveness, and minimization of agency costs. Three interconnected techniques 
typically are employed in implementing improved management control systems: (a) 
performance measurement using internal accounting systems, (b) incentives and 
disincentives intended to reward or deter particular types of behavior and performance, 
and (c) methodologies that delineate decision making authority and responsibility 
within the organization. Bureaucratic organizations define decision authority and 
responsibility by separating decision control from decision management through the 
creation of hierarchical structure.  
Responsibility Budgeting and Accounting 
A primary instrument of management control is responsibility budgeting and 
accounting, implemented through performance related techniques incorporated into 
budget formulation and execution. Typically, under responsibility budget formulation, 
organizational policies are formulated into performance and financial targets that 
correspond to the domains of administrative units and managers (Anthony and Young, 
1996: 19). In responsibility budget execution, operations are monitored and managers 
are evaluated, rewarded and sanctioned relative to achievement of performance targets. 
Responsibility budgeting thus involves organizational engineering in addition to cost 
accounting (Jones and Thompson, 1999).  
  
International Public Management Review · electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 1 · Issue 1 · 2000 · © International Public Management Network 
57 
 
Under responsibility budgeting, work is monitored and controlled in administrative 
units according to mission, function and performance targets. Administrative units and 
their relationships to each other constitute the administrative structure of the 
organization. Responsibility budgeting requires decision authority and performance 
responsibility resulting from decisions to be allocated to individuals who manage units 
within the organization. This allocation constitutes the organization's responsibility 
structure, i.e., where responsibility for mission accomplishment is centered. 
Responsibility budgeting also requires an accounting system to record, measure and 
evaluate performance information including inputs, costs, transfers, activities, and 
outputs. This system constitutes the spine of the organization’s control structure. Under 
a fully developed responsibility budgeting and accounting system, administrative units 
and responsibility centers are coterminous and fully aligned with the organization’s 
accounting and control structure, since the information it provides can be used to 
coordinate unit activities as well as to influence the decisions of responsibility center 
managers.  
Several basic rules govern organizational design in the responsibility structure 
formulation. First, organizational strategy should determine structure. Strategy means 
the pattern of purposes and policies that defines the organization and its missions and 
that positions it relative to its environment. Single mission organizations thus are 
intended to be organized along functional lines; multi-mission organizations should be 
organized along mission lines; multi-mission, multifunction organizations may be 
organized along mission lines or in matrix structure. Where a matrix organization is 
large enough to justify an extensive division of labor, responsibility centers should be 
designated as either mission or support centers, with the latter linked to the former by a 
system of internal markets and transfer prices. 
A second rule is that the organization should be as decentralized as possible. 
Management theory supports the thesis that the effectiveness of large, complex 
organizations improves when authority and responsibility are delegated out through the 
organization (Jones and Thompson, 1999).  
Thirdly, authority should not be delegated arbitrarily. Decentralization requires prior 
clarification of the purpose or function of each administrative unit and responsibility 
center, procedures for setting objectives and for monitoring and rewarding performance, 
and an accounting structure that links each responsibility and service center to the goals 
of the organization as a whole. 
As explained elsewhere (Thompson and Jones, 1986),
1
 the most significant difference 
between traditional government budgets and responsibility budgets is that government 
budgets tend to be highly detailed spending or resource acquisition plans that generally 
are required to be executed as they are approved. In contrast, operating budgets in the 
private sector are usually spare of detail, often consisting of no more than a summary of 
financial targets. One of the originators of responsibility budgeting, General Motors’ 
Alfred P. Sloan, believed that it was inappropriate and unnecessary for top managers at 
the corporate level to know much about the details of responsibility center operations 
(Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990: 40-1). If the reporting showed that performance was 
poor, that meant it was time to induce change in responsibility center management. 
Responsibility center managers showing consistently good results were promoted and 
rewarded in other ways.  
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This notion that responsibility centers should be managed objectively by the numbers 
from a small corporate headquarters reflects the effort to delegate authority and 
responsibility outward into the organization. As explained in the OECD report, 
Budgeting for Results: Perspectives on Public Expenditure Management (1995), 
delegation of authority means giving agency managers the maximum feasible authority 
needed to make their units productive or, in the alternative, subjecting them to a 
minimum of constraints. Hence, delegation of authority requires operating budgets to be 
stripped to the minimum needed to motivate and inspire subordinates. Under 
responsibility budgeting, the ideal operating budget for each administrative 
unit/responsibility center contains only one or several performance targets related to 
corresponding costs to achieve the performance indicated. (e.g., a production quota, a 
unit cost standard, or a profit or return on investment target). It is very important that 
targets be stated in monetary terms, both to compare the performance of unlike 
responsibility centers and to keep higher levels of administration away from operating 
details, thereby discouraging them from "micromanaging" the decisions of 
responsibility center managers. 
Types Of Responsibility Centers 
Responsibility centers are classified according to two dimensions:  
• The integration dimension – i.e., the relationship between responsibility center 
objectives and the overall purposes and policies of the organization;  
• The decentralization dimension – i.e., the amount of authority delegated to 
responsibility managers, measured in terms of their discretion to acquire and 
use assets.  
On the first dimension, a responsibility center can be either a mission center or a 
support center, as noted. The output of a mission center contributes directly to 
organizational objectives or purpose. The output of a support center is an input to 
another responsibility center in the organization, either another support center or a 
mission center. On the decentralization dimension, accountants distinguish among four 
types of responsibility centers based on the authority delegated to responsibility 
managers to acquire and use assets (Anthony and Young, 1995).
2
 Discretionary expense 
centers, the governmental norm, are found at one extreme and profit and investment 
centers at the other. A support center may be either an expense center or a profit center. 
If the latter, its profit is the differences between its costs and its ‘revenue’ from ‘selling’ 
its services to other responsibility centers. Both profit and investment centers are 
usually free to make decisions about issues that are significant to the long run 
performance of the organization. 
Discretionary expense centers incur costs. The difference between them and other kinds 
of responsibility centers is that their managers have no independent authority to acquire 
assets. Each acquisition must be authorized by the manager’s superiors. In the U.S. 
federal government system, under detailed line item budgets, acquisitions must be 
authorized by Congress and signed into law by the President. However, all discretionary 
expense center managers are accountable for compliance with an asset acquisition plan 
(an expense budget), whether or not written into law. Once acquisitions have been 
authorized, discretionary expense center managers are usually given considerable 
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latitude in their deployment and use. In some cases, expense center managers are 
evaluated in terms of the number and type of activities performed by their center. Where 
each of the activities performed by the center earns revenue or is assigned notational 
revenue (transfer price) by the organization’s controller, these centers are referred to as 
revenue centers. University development offices are frequently revenue centers. 
Managerial accountants generally believe that unit should be set up as a discretionary 
expense center only where there is no satisfactory way to match its expenses to final 
cost objects, as in an accounting department. 
In a cost center, the manager is held responsible for producing a stated quantity and/or 
quality of output at the lowest feasible cost. Someone else within the organization 
determines the output of a cost center — usually including various quality attributes, 
especially delivery schedules. Cost center managers are usually free to acquire short 
term assets (those that are wholly consumed within a performance measurement cycle), 
to hire temporary or contract personnel, and to manage inventories. In a standard cost 
center, output levels are determined by requests from other responsibility centers and 
the manager’s budget for each performance measurement cycle may be determined by 
multiplying actual output by standard cost per unit. Performance is measured against 
this figure — the difference between actual costs and the standard. In a quasi-profit 
center, performance is measured by the difference between the notational revenue 
earned by the center and its costs.  
In profit centers, managers are responsible for both revenues and costs. Profit is the 
difference between revenue and cost. Thus, profit center managers are evaluated in 
terms of both the revenues their centers earn and the costs they incur. In addition to the 
authority to acquire short term assets, to hire temporary or contract personnel, and to 
manage inventories, profit center managers are usually given the authority to make long 
term hires, set salary and promotion schedules (subject to organization wide standards), 
organize their units, and acquire long lived assets costing less than some specified 
amount. 
In investment centers, managers are responsible for both profit and the assets used in 
generating the profit. Thus, an investment center adds more to a manager’s scope of 
responsibility than does a profit center, just as a profit center involves more than a cost 
center. Investment center managers in the private sector are typically evaluated in terms 
of return on assets (ROA), i.e., the ratio of profit to assets employed, where the former 
is expressed as a percentage of the latter. In recent years many have turned to economic 
value added (EVA), net operating “profit” less an appropriate capital charge, which is a 
dollar amount rather than a ratio. This change has clear implications for public sector 
budgeting and accounting to move toward performance reporting, measurement and 
management, as argued in this article. 
Finally, under responsibility budgeting, support centers provide services or intermediate 
goods to other responsibility centers and charge a notational or an actual transfer price, 
e.g., in the U.S. defense department (see Jones and Thompson, 1999: insert pages).  
Reasons for transfer pricing within organizations include determining the costs of 
services provided by one unit to another, establishing and manipulating incentives, and 
measuring the performance of responsibility centers. Transfer pricing also reveals the 
internal costs of service decentralization where costs are born to transfer decision rights 
to others within an organization. When one sub-unit transfers goods, knowledge, skills, 
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etc. to another, both units calculate the cost as a means of revealing their liquid and 
tangible asset use internally and in external provision of service.  
Responsibility Structure Reform in the U.S. Government 
The federal government of the U.S. accounts for purchases, outlays, and obligations, but 
it still does not account for consumption.
3
 Full value from the application of 
responsibility budgeting can be obtained only where government adopts a meaningful 
form of consumption or accrual accounting (measuring the cost of the assets actually 
consumed producing goods or services). Because the U.S. government does not account 
for resource consumption, its cost figures are necessarily statistical in nature (i.e., they 
are not tied to its basic debit and credit bookkeeping/accounting records). Without the 
discipline that debit and credit provides, these figures are likely to be satisfactory only 
for illustrative purposes or where a decision maker must make a specific decision and a 
cost model has been tailored to the decision maker’s needs. Another aspect that 
contrasts current U.S. practice and responsibility budgeting and accounting is that the 
appropriations process does not employ a separate capital budget. Finally, the existing 
process segregates every operating cycle to fit the federal fiscal year. Under the fully 
applied responsibility budgeting and accounting concept, budgeting for operating 
expenses and capital asset acquisition is separated, and all budgeting is continuous 
across a multiple year period of time. However, in matrix or networked (versus 
hierarchical) organizations, the distinction between capital and operating budgets is less 
necessary, as is the distinction between cost estimation and cost measurement (Tani, 
1995; Otley, Broadbent, and Berry, 1995). 
Responsibility budgeting and accounting has been implemented on a broad scale 
internationally, e.g., in the United Kingdom in 1982 and modified in 1988 (Pollitt, 
1993; Lapsley, 1994), in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. All of 
these nations have adopted responsibility budgeting and accounting in one form or 
another. No nation, however, moved as far or as fast with this reform as did New 
Zealand. Moreover, New Zealand’s reformers explicitly recognized their debt to the 
framework of agency theory outlined at the beginning of this article (Boston, et al., 
1996). 
Responsibility budgeting and accounting has been attempted in the United States and 
influenced reform in both the Bush Administration in the period 1988-1992 and the 
initiatives of the Clinton Administration from 1993 to 2000. Additionally, the content of 
both the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act) and Vice President Gore’s 
National Performance Review called for performance-oriented organizations and 
mission driven, results oriented budgets (Jones and McCaffery, 1992; Jones and 
McCaffery, 1997; OECD, 1995: 230). Further, in 1993 Congress passed the 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) that requires experimentation with 
responsibility budgeting and accounting and reporting by all departments and agencies 
of the federal government under the supervision of the Office of Management and 
Budget and oversight committees of Congress. In particular, the Defense Management 
Report Initiatives under Bush and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and the Gore 
NPR stimulated considerable effort at accounting and financial management reform in 
the U. S. Department of Defense. Clearly, greater progress was made under Bush (e.g., 
introduction of reimbursable transaction accounting and budgeting) than during the 
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Clinton - Gore administration, but both successes and failures have resulted from these 
initiatives (Thompson and Jones, 1994; Jones and Thompson, 1999). It is clear that 
government-wide progress has not been rapid. As with most large governments, the 
U.S. federal government has been slow to change (Jones and McCaffery, 1997; Jones 
and Thompson, 1999). The impetus to change presently emanates from a combination 
of the CFO Act and the GPRA.  
The CFO Act requires double-entry bookkeeping and accrual accounting, neither of 
which are standard practice in the U.S. federal government. To receive a clear audit 
report from the Inspectors General who perform CFO audits, these accounting changes 
need to be implemented in federal department and agency accounting systems. 
However, few federal agencies can comply with either the double-entry or accrual 
requirements, and there is resistance to investing to do so given that the federal budget 
and appropriation accounting are done primarily on a single entry and cash basis. 
Changes in federal appropriation law and congressional appropriation procedures, at 
minimum, appear to be required to push federal agencies further toward CFO Act 
compliance.  
The GPRA requires strategic planning (SP) and development of performance measures, 
which has been implemented throughout the government, and linkage between SP and 
resource planning and budgets, which has been done with varying success. Further, 
GPRA invited agency experimentation with performance budgets on a voluntary basis, 
to be evaluated by Congress. To date, the results from these experiments have not 
persuaded Congress or the President's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that 
broad application of performance budgeting, using an agency theory oriented 
contracting system of the type employed in New Zealand and elsewhere, is worth the 
effort. Agencies report that their own ability to plan and execute programs, and to 
justify budgets has been in some instances enhanced as a result of SP and performance 
measure development (as required by OMB). However, few agencies and no 
departments in total have the capacities in their accounting systems and procedures that 
permit accurate and reliable (or in some cases any) linkage between performance or 
results data and costs or budgets. Consequently, whether reporting costs related to 
organizational units, functions, accounts and sub-accounts or workload for the CFO 
Act, or cost performance (e.g., for results) for GPRA, there is little hope for broad-scale 
success in the medium term for most of the U.S. federal government. 
There are additional explanations for this fact. The first is that many participants and 
observers of the U. S. expenditure process reject the notion that responsibility budgeting 
and accounting can be reconciled with the American legislative budgetary process. 
Some even assert that it can be practiced only by unitary governments under the 
Westminster model, although that claim seems to be contradicted by Swiss and Swedish 
examples of successful implementation (Schedler, 1995; Arwidi and Samuelson, 1993). 
While acknowledging that it would not be easy to reconcile responsibility budgeting 
and accounting with the American legislative process, we do not believe that they are 
necessarily incompatible (Thompson, 1994; Harr, 1989; Harr and Godfrey, 1991 & 
1992). If operating budgets were multiple year and funded on the base of what 
departments and agencies received in their previous year's base, which is how federal 
budgeting operates for the most part presently only on a one year cycle (Wildavsky, 
1964; Wildavsky and Caiden, 2000), then budgets could be linked to whatever 
performance standards congressional appropriators (and authorizers) would prefer. 
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Good performance would be rewarded and poor performance sanctioned -- again, much 
as it is done presently. Departments and agencies would benefit from a more predictable 
revenue base, and presumably this stability would be reflected in better service to 
citizens, although this advantage cannot be predicted accurately.  
Capital budgeting under responsibility budgeting would be separate from operating 
budgets, continuous and responsive to department needs and justification as per the 
current system. However, persuading members of congress to pass up opportunities for 
annual "pork rushes" to push pet projects in favor of a more stable, longer-term resource 
allocation methodology would not be easy, because it is through the annual budget that 
rewards are provided to loyal and, in some cases, needy constituents. Perhaps the Senate 
would be more likely to adopt multiple year appropriation because senators are elected 
for terms of six years, and are often reelected for several terms. On the other hand, 
members of the House of Representatives serve in two year terms, which means that 
they have much shorter time horizons within which to provide benefits to supporters. 
Clearly, multiple year budgeting would be a much harder sell in the House. Still, the 
reelection rate of members of the House is high, so there is moderate continuity in the 
business of the lower house of Congress. However, the high rate of reelection is in part 
attributable to the ability of representatives to demonstrate results from their election 
quickly. Of course, none of this mitigates against the use of performance measures in 
budgeting. It only affect incentives toward longer-term or continuous budgeting. And, 
obviously, little that Congress does with its budget process has anything to do with 
improving department and agency performance accounting, as demonstrated by the 
limited results achieved under the CFO Act. 
Another, perhaps weaker, explanation for failure of responsibility budgeting and 
accounting to influence government accounting and budget practices in the United 
States significantly is that, unlike most other countries, America has large, well-
organized associations of government accountants, auditors, budgeters, program 
analysts, and teachers of government accounting and budgeting. All of these groups 
have to varying degrees a vested interest in differentiating public from private practice, 
because that difference gives value to their expertise. Anyone inclined to doubt the 
significance of this explanation should look carefully at the politics of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB), responsible for developing 
accounting standards for the U. S. federal government, where accountant members did 
not understand the perspective of appropriation law and the budgetary process and those 
with experience with appropriations process were frustrated at having to confront a wide 
range of issues that seemed unresolvable unless appropriation law and procedures were 
modified, as noted.. The standards were completed in 1997, but their success is now 
under evaluation as departments and agencies attempt to implement the CFO Act, with 
mixed results. What agencies complain about most, in addition to the absence of 
financial support for implementation, are the inconsistencies between the standards and 
the capabilities of the accounting systems, data bases and procedures used by their 
agencies to perform required tasks in budget formulation and execution, i.e., the same 
things that irritated “budget-wise” members of FASAB during development of the 
standards.  
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Responsibility Structure Reform in Italy 
The introduction of responsibility budgeting in Italian government is a recent 
phenomenon. This introduction is only a part, even if particularly important, of a larger 
process aimed at the modernization of all Italian government. Many sectors of Italian 
government have been reformed during the 1990s. The sectors generally considered 
more advanced in this process are local governments, and health service organizations. 
Central government was also interested in reforms that attempted to introduce New 
Public Management philosophy and the related managerial tools but, national 
government seems more resistant to change in comparison with other parts of Italian 
public administration. Since the aim of this article is examining responsibility budgeting 
in government, local government is the focus of this exploration on Italian practice. This 
choice is to the fact that, in the last six years, it has been the object of the most 
interesting reforms in Italian government. Initially, it must be clear that local 
government in Italy is not a homogenous and standardized phenomenon. Furthermore, 
the socio-economic status of our Italy is far from uniform and this is unavoidably 
reflected in the behavior of administrators and those administered, in the different parts 
of the country.  
In addition to Provinces there are more than 8,000 municipalities, the greatest portion of 
which have very small numbers of inhabitants (in 1995 only 1325 Municipalities had 
more than 8,000 inhabitants). This implies that, in practice, a large majority of public 
entities do not have human and financial resources at their disposal which are capable of 
implementing a demanding process of reforms. However, the National Legislature has 
already changed the rules of the accounting and budgeting practice for the nation 
through laws passed in the early 1990s, and this is the sure sign that the process of 
modernization of government can no longer be prevented. In the Italian situation, and 
especially in the institutional context of local government, it is not necessary to use the 
adjective “new” in the sense that the mode that Italy is trying to change cannot be 
labeled presently as managerial. Any implementation with a public management 
orientation will be new. The aim of this portion of the article is to provide reflections on 
the relationship between autonomy, responsibility and the introduction of a new 
conception of public management and management control in Italy. The effort here is to 
verify whether, and to what extent, the conquest of autonomy and the assignment of 
responsibility for results can contribute to stimulating a new public sector managerial 
culture in Italy.  
There is extensive literature in Italy that explains the reasons for the prevailing of 
bureaucratic and formalist culture in our public administration and the difference 
between the managerial culture and control (see for example Borgonovi, 1988; 
Borgonovi, 1991; Anselmi, 1993; Mussari, 1994). It is necessary to emphasize the 
significant role that the law has in Italy. The life of our national and local communities 
is ruled by an enormous number of norms (laws, decrees, legislative decrees, circulars, 
regulations, and so on), continuously renewed or updated, that oblige public 
administrators to be experts more in law than in management. Current reform of local 
governments is based on a significant number of laws and decrees and entails the 
updating of municipal statutes and regulations. 
The overproduction of rules often generates strong contradictions between norms so 
that, sometimes, the behavior of public administrators differs according to the law they 
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consider as prevailing. It is not accidental that the leaders of public organizations and a 
large majority of politicians have been educated in the disciplines of law or political 
science rather than public administration, management or business administration. In 
the 1990s, the evils of poor of no management control and poor choice of which laws to 
enforce and to ignore was made more evident by financial scandals and corruption 
(Tangentopoli) that shook the country. The fear of error and of the legal consequences 
of error has been so strong that many local and national public services have been 
virtually paralyzed or significantly decelerated, e.g., public works. Scandals have ended 
up reinforcing the traditional prevailing model in Italian public administration that is 
excessively bureaucratic and one of relatively arbitrary rule enforcement relative to 
political motives and expedience.  
Management control systems in Italy are not based on a results orientation in terms of 
efficiency, effectiveness, quality, equity or other criteria, but on the stiff observance of 
highly defined rules – rules typically decided upon and written very far from local 
communities. This kind of control, generally labeled as legalistic and bureaucratic, is 
the expression of an administrative culture and of a general culture designed to prove 
the validity of predominating rules and models. So, the basic problem in Italy is not to 
overcome or to update a managerial model that is “old” in order to change it for a new 
and more effective one, but to introduce, de novo, a managerial orientation that does not 
have historical or cultural roots in Italian government. 
Given this fact, the first question to be answered is why did the debate about the 
necessity for exchanging the bureaucratic model for a managerial model begin in Italy? 
The most fundamental answer is that the existing model no longer works. Secondly, the 
reasons for the development of pressure for transformation can be traced to the need to 
supply a reasonable, non-utopian reply to the signals emerging from the contemporary 
economic and social scenario. Redesign of local government and the manifest 
legislative rules of law demonstrates a will to re-establish stronger links between local 
governments and the administered community. This effort is an attempt to fill the gap 
which, over the decades, has been created between the capacity to fulfill social needs 
and the actual capacity of local authorities to respond to demand for better service. 
Local officials need to learn to heed these signals, to decode, and to interpret them in 
order to translate them into effective solutions. In fact, the crisis of local governments is 
widely verifiable by observing that the administered community is neither adequately 
served nor satisfied with service availability and quality.  
For too long a time, local governments have been estranged from the Italian public, 
functioning in effect as quasi-closed systems providing services to politicians and 
government officials. Consequently, with a some exceptions, in Italy there is little 
match between the values upon which decisions and actions of local administrators 
(politicians and officials) are based and the values held by different local communities, 
i.e., the values of people, families, businesses that pay taxes and use public services and 
legitimate the existence of local government. This is the “government failure” portion of 
the demand for managerial reform. Other variables include an increase in the service 
expectations of local communities as a result of better education, ever growing 
municipal problems that require attention and more rapid replies to continually 
changing circumstances, a reborn faith in market mechanisms as a means to guarantee 
social equilibrium, a national crisis of public finance, the disappearance of traditional 
political parties, and changes in the electoral system.  
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Some of the consequences emerging from the variables noted above include: 
1. More affluent people turning to private services as an alternative to public 
services, i.e., public services are only for poor people; 
2. Difficulty for taxpayers to understand the relationship between taxes paid and 
the qualitative and quantitative level of the services offered; 
3. The progressive return to market mechanisms for a growing number of public 
services (health, education, etc.);  
4. The weakening of the institutional conditions that artificially guarantee the 
survival of local government organizations. 
Local governments face the need to respond to a different articulation of the scale of 
needs that follows modification of the cultural characteristics of the community 
(Catturi, 1995: 21; see also Di Toro, 1993; Farneti, 1995). They must do so not only by 
varying the mix of products and the services rendered but by changing managerial 
objectives to coherently correspond to the evolution of the socio-economic scenario in 
which they operate. Given these reasons for change, Italian local governments will be 
successful only if the subjects who have the duty to run them (politicians and officials) 
promote new values: learning capacity, organizational flexibility, orientation to quality, 
centrality of the citizen-user-tax-payer in the economic processes, clear identification of 
goals, objectives, attribution of resources, responsibility for results and overall 
performance of the system.  
Autonomy as a Necessary Condition for Responsibility 
Metcalfe and Richards (Metcalfe and Richards, 1987: 217) state that management 
means taking responsibility for the performance of a system. There is a consensus 
among public management scholars (see for example Jones and Thompson, 1999) that 
autonomy is a precondition, necessary but not sufficient, for effective management. It is 
not feasible to judge managers responsible for the results of an organization, function or 
a service without having made them autonomous. This condition is summarized in the 
expression, “the right to manage.” Yet, we should clarify some aspects of this view. 
Is it possible to have autonomous management and a management responsible for the 
results inside a public organization that is not autonomous? If we look at the Italian 
historical experience we come up with a negative conclusion. When local governments 
are not autonomous, the agents they serve are not in the local community but the central 
government of Italy that guarantees organizational survival. Because of cultural 
hindrances and also to guarantee equal treatment between different provinces and 
regions, in this situation the law becomes the only rule by which to measure results. 
Thus, the first step to be taken to arrive at a managerial orientation is full recognition of 
the autonomy of local governments. In this analysis we distinguish two types of 
autonomy: autonomy of local government, and autonomy inside local government 
Autonomy of Local Government 
What does autonomy of local government mean? From who has local government to be 
autonomous? Autonomy means the possibility, capacity and will to make decisions, to 
  
International Public Management Review · electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 1 · Issue 1 · 2000 · © International Public Management Network 
66 
 
direct decisions, resources and actions towards defined and proper objectives that reflect 
the values shared by the local community. Autonomy, then, means to have the freedom 
to make independent decisions and to establish strategic and operative objectives along 
with the ways to fulfill them. Autonomy also includes the capacity of survival without 
artificial intervention based upon economic and social evaluation made by the taxpayers 
and users of public goods and services. An organization is autonomous when its 
components are coordinated to allow – by means of their dynamism – the fulfillment of 
the aims for which it exists (on autonomy of Italian local government, see Zangrandi, 
1994). 
Local governments were declared autonomous in the Italian Constitution (Articles 5 and 
128) but, up to the promulgation of new law in 1990, autonomy was essentially 
fictitious. The autonomy of Italian local government is a recent, but still not completely 
realized, convention. Since the 1970s the expansion of local government service 
responsibility in the areas of social welfare and education has been very rapid, but there 
has not been a corresponding expansion of the tax base or managerial competence. This 
disparity, coupled with the decision to centralize Italian tax collection, increased 
dependence on the central government and caused a crisis of results and, slowly, of 
legitimization. The gap between the cost of local services and the insufficient taxes 
raised locally has been filled by central government transfers. This has contributed to 
raising the Italian national debt and deficit. The acknowledgment of local government 
autonomy is, on the one hand, a late answer to a social embarrassment and, on the other 
hand, an attempt to reduce the financial burden caused by the centralized fiscal system. 
And, the absence of autonomy was not limited to tax or financial matters, as noted 
below.  
Previous to the approval of reforms in the 1990s, the following conditions applied. 
Public finance was strongly centralized. The central government raised money from 
taxation and distributed money, year by year, directly or through another public entity 
(regional government for instance) to local governments to perform many public 
functions and services. However, only a very small part of disposable national resources 
that derived from local communities was returned. It is important to note that, in the 
past, resources were transferred according to several criteria (in particular past 
expenditure) but none of these reflected the capacity of local governments to 
economically satisfy the needs of local users. The quantity of transferred resources 
depended essentially on the political leverage and negotiation abilities of the local 
government lobby in Parliament and, above all, on the fiscal and financial situation of 
the Italian state more than on performance. And the capacity of local governments 
seemed to be dependent more on the money available than on the capacity for using it 
wisely. 
The administration was regulated by several Consolidation Acts promulgated before or 
during the years of fascism, i.e., before the present Italian Constitution was approved in 
1948. This meant that organization of services, the way of rendering them, and the 
functioning rules were centrally fixed and, essentially, the same for all local 
governments without regard for their specific characteristics. The Local Government 
Model was uniform and predetermined by the State. Budget, accounting and financial 
reporting were modeled on those of the State. The system was very traditional without 
accrual accounting or management accounting. This was consistent with the centralized 
model of the State. Accounting language had to be the same since the system was only 
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used to allocate resources rather than according to the socio-economic effects of 
decisions. There was no a performance measurement system. 
Auditing was internal and, in conformity with the law of 1934, the accounts of local 
governments were audited by three councilors chosen by the Municipal Council among 
those who were not members of the Town Executive Board. The role of the auditors 
consisted of verifying the “formal correctness” of decisions made by the Town 
Executive Board and the correspondence between values reported in the accounting 
books and the figures in the Statement of Accounts. Therefore, this consisted of only a 
legitimacy control without any regard for the results of local government activity. 
Moreover, even if in most cases the audit function was assigned to honest people this, 
unfortunately, did not determine professional competence in performing the job. 
Since the spending power was in the hands of the Town Executive Board and not senior 
officials, politicians ended up managing without requisite competence and, in so doing, 
neglected the role of managers. The consequent want of coordination among the various 
functions of the local government organizations made it impossible to making anyone 
responsible for the results of programs and services. In turn, the relationship between 
planning, execution and performance could not be clearly specified and this caused a 
lack of feedback of information for managerial and political decision-making and 
reporting to citizens. 
The process of New Public Management (NPM) oriented reform started in 1990 (Law 
n.142, of 8 June 1990) and other reform laws passed since have contributed to 
modifying the features described above. Two fundamental principles have been 
prominent since 1990: 
1. Financial autonomy of local governments was guaranteed based on the 
certainty of receiving their own and transferred resources; 
2. Local governments gained the power to levy new taxes. Local government 
finance remained a mixed type with the State continuing to finance local 
institutions by means of transfers.  
The reform law stated that the State will continue to contribute to the financing of local 
services which are considered indispensable, the State assigns specific contributions to 
cope with exceptional situations; the State contributes to local government investment 
in financing public works of primary social and economic interest. All the other services 
that local governments wanted to render to their communities have to be financed by 
levying taxes or imposing prices at a level sufficient to recover the full incurred costs. 
New local taxes have been introduced (in particular a local property tax intended to 
constitute the central pivot for fiscal autonomy). Other taxes have been reformed and 
now local governments can issue bonds. 
Since 1990, municipalities can be established to render social services, and each local 
government has its own Statute (Charter) and regulations. Old laws have been 
abrogated. Now, the State establishes only the main criteria, the principles, and it is the 
local government that has to establish its own rules. The Statute is a sort of constitution 
for local government where each authority can determine the norms which before were 
imposed by national law. It contains the fundamental norms for the entire organization, 
for the tasks of the entire single organs and their co-ordination. Municipalities are free 
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to decide the number of staff needed to perform each function and service following 
principles of autonomy and economy, and according to criteria of professionalism and 
responsibility. Particular emphasis has been placed by the Italian Legislature on public 
participation and encouragement of local government to engage in dialogue with their 
communities to take into consideration all public information in decision making 
processes. 
The financial accounting system was modernized and managerial accounting was 
introduced. In 1995, a reform was approved that significantly changed the previous 
system. Below are summarized some of the most important innovations from this 
change.  
1. Guidance for programming activity is strongly reinforced and the fiscal 
authorization function is designated to a multi-annual budget; 
2. The classification of expenditure in the budget is now less detailed than in the 
past to enhance the intelligibility of the document and reduce the necessity to 
update the budget too often during the fiscal year; 
3. The cash budget was abrogated; 
4. The operative budget was introduced, aimed at making officials responsible 
for results of the organizational units (services) they manage; 
5. A management control system is mandatory; 
6. Accrual accounting will be gradually implemented by local governments; 
7. Financial reporting has the obligation to prepare not only a financial 
accounting but also a reliable balance sheet and a profit and loss account.  
Notwithstanding the necessity to guarantee formal and substantial uniformity to public 
accounts to allow their consolidation, the law gives local governments a certain degree 
of autonomy also in the accounting field, especially with regard to financial reporting. 
For instance, it is possible to add indicators of efficiency and effectiveness, to draw up a 
consolidated balance sheet, and to present a balance sheet at the beginning and at the 
end of the electoral mandate. 
However, the real obstacle to overcome is not simply the production of this or other 
more sophisticated data but the understanding of their usefulness and, consequently, the 
will and capacity of communicating them. It is clear that the success of the reform will 
depend not only on the production of new accounting information, but also on the 
understanding that this effort is useful only if it produces effects. Since in the area of 
communication style each local government is widely autonomous, these organizations 
should be concerned with exploiting this opportunity. 
What can be said for sure is that the old way of producing and communicating 
accounting data no longer will work (see Caperchione and Garlatti, 1994; Matteuzzi 
Mazzoni, 1983; Mulazzani, 1992; Puddu, 1984). The informative objectives, the quality 
and the quantity of public needs to be satisfied, the role of public organizations in the 
present scenario have definitively changed. But, above all, the interlocutors of local 
governments have changed: management control responsibility no longer resides with 
the Central Government but with the local communities. Importantly, the new 
accounting system has been implemented starting in 1999. And, unfortunately, there 
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have been legislative interventions aimed at modifying some important aspects of the 
reform. 
A new audit system also was introduced in 1990. The introduction of professional 
auditing is an attempt to satisfy the growing demand for transparency in the managing 
of public money and should act as a deterrent against impudent local administration. 
However, in addition to traditional financial auditing, the Board of Auditors, made up of 
three professional Auditors, must evaluate results achieved in terms of performance 
(efficiency, productivity and overall performance) so that the Council can judge 
managerial performance, and make political choices using economic information which, 
before the reform, was practically non-existent (on the need for accounting to relate 
economic information, see Stewart, 1986; Stewart, 1988; Giovannelli,1995; Mussari 
and Scalera, 1994). 
The Board of Auditors, in conformity with the law, the Statute, and the regulations of 
the municipality, must: 
1. Ensure that funds have been spent in accordance with what was approved in 
the budget and verify the formal correctness of the decisions made by the 
Town Executive Board; 
2. Cooperate with the Town Council in its function of control and policy; 
3. Prepare a report, enclosed with the statement of accounts, in which it 
expresses remarks and proposals aiming to achieve greater efficiency, 
productivity and overall performance. 
Considerable importance is now attributed to the auditors’ duty to express substantiated 
judgement on the clarity, coherence and reliability of the budget and relative projects 
and programs. The auditors are bound to suggest to the Council all measures necessary 
to guarantee a credible framework. In turn, the Council is required to carry out all such 
measures or to adequately substantiate any lack of compliance with the auditing body. 
Thus, the Board of Auditors becomes, in addition to its traditional role, a kind of 
consultant directly connected to the supreme decision makers of the organization, the 
Council, in the performance of its functions of management control and policy (Marchi, 
1997; Mussari, 1997; Persiani, 1996).  
Autonomy Inside Local Government 
The apparent achievement of greater local government autonomy can be judged a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for improved management control of local 
government. We must address the question: autonomy from whom? In this 
circumstance the answer is far more complex since it presupposes a clarification of the 
meaning of management of local government. If it is really necessary to identify 
specific subjects in order to give them the qualification of public managers, probably we 
should admit that this term refers to public officials who are irresponsible for local 
services rather than to elected representatives. This would mean looking at local 
government managers in the strict sense. If we accept this limitation, the answer to the 
previous question (autonomy from whom?) is autonomy from politicians.  
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Without entering into political detail that is not important for our analysis, it is evident 
that a primary goal of the National Legislator was to permit municipalities and citizens 
to regain the decision power that in the past was largely held by long-standing political 
parties that have been involved in scandals related to widespread corruption. Thus, the 
mayor is no longer chosen by the majority parties but is elected in open elections. 
Further, the mayor is no longer the “hostage” of the Town Council, given direct by the 
citizens on the basis of a detailed program that, during the electoral campaign, must be 
communicated and in which candidates have to compete against each other for office. 
With these and other political changes, public managers are given latitude to focus more 
succinctly on the administrative activities that occur within government agencies. 
Instead of emphasizing the political considerations that permeate the policy process and 
pervade the external relations of government organizations, public management is 
primarily concerned with the policy implementation. On the contrary, if we were to 
refer to local government management as a process, without any specific interest in 
identifying the managers of local government, then we cannot limit the responsibility 
for management only to those predominantly involved in administrative functions. 
Management, therefore, is a process, the starting point for strategic choice of priority 
among purposes and the best means of achieving them (Borgonovi, 1988: 133). This 
process of strategic decision-making defines the way in which a number of tasks, 
inherent in management, are to be interpreted, together with the conditions that are 
essential for these tasks to be delivered effectively. These processes of management are, 
moreover, always located within and have to respond to a particular institutional and 
environmental context. Management is not just an executive process separate from 
policy making: effective public management requires strong links between policy-
making and implementation. In the real world, there is no clear division between 
management and politics. 
However, we have to recognize that a similar approach demands a maturity of political 
class that cannot be easily verified in Italy especially given the disappearance of some 
traditional political parties. Yet, if we agree with the broader definition of local 
government management (management as a process that involves both the politicians 
and officials responsible for services), management autonomy should be referenced to 
the whole organization and, consequently, autonomy should be from central 
government, and responsibility for results should be with respect to the administered 
community and citizen users of local services. 
On the other hand, we cannot overlook the fact that within any public organization it is 
necessary to establish roles, competencies and consequent responsibilities to avoid 
overlapping confusion. We cannot overlook that the absence of clear delineation of the 
roles of politicians, senior officials and staff is common and, after corruption, the most 
important reason for the crisis in Italian government. A qualifying element of the Italian 
reforms was the new distinction between politicians and officials responsibility for 
services. The solution offered by the National Legislature to solve the problem was to 
clearly establish and separate the tasks and the responsibilities of managers and 
politicians. 
A rigid definition of roles and competencies will only work from a theoretical point of 
view since the solution ignores that local government is, first of all, an organization, a 
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system in which the parts have to communicate and cooperate to achieve goals and 
objectives. It would be naive not to take into consideration the fact that public 
organizations will have try hard to find practical solutions to ensure harmonious 
coordination between the political and the managerial.  
Given these crucial considerations, according to the law, managers must now: 
1. Manage offices and services according to the criteria and the norms 
established in the Statute and regulations of the municipality; 
2. Perform all the tasks, including the adoption of acts to bind the administration 
to other entities, which the State law and the local Statute do not reserve 
specifically to other organs of the municipality. 
The approval of the accounting reform introduced important innovations. Each year, 
following the approval of the municipal budget by the Council that is following the 
decision on the amount of funds that can be spent for each program, function and 
service, the executive board assigns an operative budget to each manager responsible 
for a service. 
In this document, the short-term objectives to be fulfilled, for each service, is known in 
advance (this should be consistent with those defined in the documents in which the 
programs are drawn up) and the financial, human and technical resources available 
during the next year. So, an important process of decentralization has been promoted, 
the consequences of which should be: 
1. The necessity for managers to have more specialized information and skills; 
2. The increase of managerial autonomy from the Town Executive Board in 
decision-making -- it is important to note that in the future the spending power 
will be in the hands of managers and not Town Executive Board members; 
3. Increase of authority and prestige for managers. 
The Town Executive Board is made up of the elected mayor and assessors (councilors) 
whose number is fixed by statute to link the maximum number relative to municipal 
population. The mayor gives each assessor a delegation for a specific sector of 
municipal administration. Then, whereas in the previous system the assessors were 
independent from the mayor, since they were appointed by the Town Council, under the 
new reform they are qualified by the law as appointees responsible to the mayor. 
These norms entail a redistribution of decision power between political actors and 
managers of local governments. The clear identification of objectives and performance 
targets to be assigned to managers, along with the other variables mentioned in the 
previous paragraphs, signal a change for managers. They are also intended to impose 
widespread use of management techniques (including management accounting) 
indispensable for performing new tasks and making managers responsible for results. 
Definition of the Management Control Structure 
To clarify the definition of Italian local government management control and 
responsibility reform it is necessary to define the persons now to be held responsible for 
results. This, in turn, entails clarification of our conception of management. In this 
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effort we limit our analysis to top public officials whom, according to the will of the 
legislature, are considered managers responsible for both internal and external services. 
The organizational structure of the municipality is articulated by services, grouped in 
functions, and each service becomes a responsibility center led by a manager 
responsible for the use of the resources assigned by the approval of the municipal 
budget. Three issues to be resolved in defining management control responsibilities and 
relationships are: 
1. Who demonstrates results and who has the right to make decisions based on 
results? 
2. How are the objectives set and what do we mean by results? 
3. What techniques should be used to demonstrate results? 
Results Responsibility and Decision Rights 
Under the new approach, local government managers are accountable to the Town 
Executive Board, and in particular to the mayor. The mayor, who is directly elected by 
local voters, has significant powers. The mayor appoints the members of the Town 
Executive Board, the representatives of the municipality to public entities, and officials 
responsible for offices and services. In addition, the mayor attributes tasks including 
those for external cooperation. The power of appointing and, in some cases, of 
dismissing, gives the mayor the possibility to that programs introduced are operative. 
Decision power and responsibility for the results are now concentrated on more 
recognizable subjects than in the previous system. In particular, the mayor’s power to 
appoint members of the Town Executive Board, the town managers, and the 
management of public entities related to the municipality, should create greater stability, 
cohesion and coherence in the actions of the government. Greater efficiency in the 
organization of the public services also should occur. Following the most recent reforms 
of 1998, officials responsible for services are essentially accountable to the mayor since 
they are appointed by him or her and because each year the Town Executive Board 
assigns to each manager the resources necessary for fulfilling the objectives for the 
following year by approving operating budgets. 
Objective Setting and Definition of Results 
Managers have the right to manage but the area of their responsibility has increased 
significantly. Since the power to spend is in their hands and no longer in those of 
politicians who only to approve budgets, the concept of responsibility has broadened 
considerably and now it includes not only formal and legal responsibility, but also the 
evaluation of results achieved in terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. This 
implies that it is no longer only the law that dictates the standards by which the 
performance of public officials is measured. In addition, new and more subjective 
evaluation criteria of managerial activity must be introduced. Separate from the 
technical implications of this necessity, it should be noted that an important 
consequence will be the change in the role of public officials (now public managers). 
As noted, there should be a redistribution of power inside municipal organizations. In 
the past, public officials learned that correct behavior was judged by conformity to rules 
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regardless of results and they tended to avoid the exercise of discretion because such an 
act could easily be deemed an infraction of law. Now, public managers should be able 
to be more innovative, experimental and, to some extent, prepared to take risks (Blease, 
Graham and Hays, 1986: 14; Hopwood, 1984:171). Contrary to the past, there is no 
longer a pre-packaged answer dictated by the law, experience or political convenience. 
Instead, it is necessary, within the limits of the resources available, to make autonomous 
decisions and run the consequent risks to obtain the results desired by the mayor and 
Town Executive Board. 
Techniques to Demonstrate Results 
The tools for acquiring information on results achieved by officials responsible for 
services to evaluate performance are limited, even if not exclusively, to the area of 
accounting and Value for Money Auditing. Limiting our analysis to relations between 
managers and the mayor and Town Executive Board, the organizational structure should 
be divided up into responsibility centers, that is the services, and responsibility 
accounting should be the main tool to be used to measure managerial performance. 
Unfortunately, in this field Italian municipalities are only beginning to experiment. On 
one hand, there are cultural barriers to evaluation in the use of any technique in a 
context that has not considered efficiency and effectiveness as measurable or valuable. 
Secondly, in many municipalities there is a lack of financial resources and technical 
competence to define and measure results and to perform evaluation. 
However, independent of the ability to introduce new systems of evaluation, the value 
placed on accounting and auditing information is bound to increase and the evaluative 
role will not be limited to the assessment of managerial performance but will also 
influence priorities, policy determination and decision-making (Borgonovi, 1991: 185-
186). In this respect, if distribution of power within local governments changes, it is 
possible, paradoxically, politicians may pressure for the introduction of new techniques 
to control and evaluate managerial performance. 
In coherence with these developments and in line with the precepts of national labor 
contracts, local governments are bound to evaluate the performance and duties of their 
managers. This evaluation is to be repeated yearly and is based on the principle of 
participatory evaluation. The task is entrusted to an internal evaluation organ whose 
formation was provided for in law in 1993 and modified in 1999. Therefore, the data 
collected not only makes it possible to remunerate managers with variable salaries, but 
also puts the mayor and the Town Executive Board in a better position to make 
decisions concerning reconfirmation of the posts assigned to executives in the 
organizational units. 
There are two separate but interconnected remuneration parameters (role and 
performance) of the evaluation system. Role evaluation requires setting relative values 
for each professional role through the adoption of globally accepted criteria. Role 
evaluation is in no way dependent on judgement of the individual assigned to the role 
under evaluation. It takes into consideration the necessary qualifications, 
responsibilities, organizational relations and complexities associated with each role.  
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Performance evaluation is based on the extent to which specific objectives or pre-
defined performance goals are attained. This requires detailed and timely programming 
of operations. Performance evaluation also involves analysis of any organizational 
practices considered relevant for a particular role. As such, it takes into consideration 
aspects including capacity to motivate, leading and evaluating collaborators, promotion 
of technological innovation and efforts to integrate the organization and its services 
(Busco and Riccaboni, 1999). 
The National Legislature seems to have indicated in the reforms that level of citizen 
satisfaction should influence policy and organizational decisions of the officials 
responsible for services. If so, it is in the interest of the elected representatives and, in 
particular, of the mayor to control the activity of the managers. This is because they 
have no managerial powers themselves, but instead have powers to control managers. 
However, politicians have to answer to the local citizens on the quality, effectiveness, 
equity and efficiency of local public services. Consequently, they should be come more 
results oriented in their demands on managers. 
This underlines the direct relationship between the local government elected by the 
people and the demonstrated ability to manage public resources. If political consensus is 
increasingly influenced by the quality and quantity of the services supplied, as well as 
by ideological factors including values, common interests and opportunity (Catturi, 
1995: 20; Costa, 1991: 362), then political consensus will be determined more by the 
ability of local government officials to do the things for which they are elected or 
appointed. As the values and expectations of society create pressure in terms of 
quantitative and qualitative increase of things to be done, the ability to find the best 
combination in the use of scarce resources becomes a more visible and important 
element for acquiring and maintaining political consensus. The following appears to be 
occurring in Italian municipal politics: 
1. Because the number of people who believe political promises appears to be 
decreasing, as citizens are tired and disappointed by inconsequential 
ideologies, politicians may be obliged to make their messages and promises 
more personal and results-oriented to reach all citizens and not just specific 
political interest groups; 
2. The form used to communicate the political message generally no longer is 
holding citizen attention because it has been perceived to be inadequate in 
content. Therefore, the form of the message may change, i.e., more toward a 
results-orientation; 
3. Many citizens now have a better-informed view of public services and the 
responsibilities of government. They have learned to decode political 
messages and refuse to receive stimuli passively; 
4. The increasingly presence of reference values favoring more effective 
government among citizens and citizen groups, and increased public 
awareness of financial and managerial scandal and fraud in government 
makes difficult all relationships of trust in the polity. What citizens expect from 
public officials and managers is shifting to clarity on objectives, honesty about 
results, and more effective delivery of services. 
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Obstacles to Italian Reform of Management Control 
There are two primary obstacles to the transformation of administrative culture taking 
place in Italy: 
1. Part of the political class does not willingly accept losing its spending power 
and, consequently, its ability to influence the effects of public activity. 
Therefore, some use all means possible to restrain the increased autonomy of 
public officials; 
2. Many public officials realize that they do not have the technical know-how for 
carrying out their assigned functions autonomously and are afraid of being 
judged on the basis of results that they are not certain can be achieved. They 
are tempted to maintain the status-quo to avoid being judged on the basis of 
parameters completely alien to their culture and, above all, that they are 
unable to control. For some, it seems better not to be autonomous and not to 
have the worries that come with responsibility. Furthermore, this tendency has 
been increased by a lack of trust in auditors. From the beginning of the reform 
period in the late 1990s, auditors did not seem to favor the change in 
management control to greater autonomy and voiced concern over what they 
perceived as an absence of effective managerial incentive to stimulate good 
performance. 
Conclusions 
There are distinct similarities between the management control reform initiatives in the 
United States and Italy. In both nations, the driving force for implementation of 
responsibility budgeting and accounting is the legislative branch -- the U.S. Congress 
and the Italian Parliament. In both systems, increased emphasis on delegation of 
responsibility to managers is a cornerstone of reform and has met with political 
resistance. In both cases, there is an absence of capacity, in managerial preparation and 
in the capabilities of accounting systems, to fully implement the changes authorized. In 
both nations, traditional budget process roles are or will be changed with 
implementation of reform. In both nations there are technical problems in learning how 
to define and use performance and results measures to influence decision making. In 
both the U. S. and Italy, parts of the administrative culture prefer a safer existence with 
less rather than more responsibility for results. In both nations, the legislative branch 
has directed elected officials and managers to become more responsive to citizen 
demands and preferences and to report financial and service results with increased 
transparency. 
The changes in management control in the U. S. and Italy detailed in this article provide 
some new perspectives on the implementation of responsibility budgeting and 
accounting. Although problems faced in these nations have been encountered and 
resolved to varying degrees in a number of other nations, the means for overcoming 
barriers to implementation tend to be particular to each nation to a great extent in our 
view (Jones and Thompson, 1999: 169-171). However, some generalizations seem to be 
evident.  
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It is now apparent, as not before, that responsibility budgeting and accounting systems 
restrict the upward flow of operating information within public organizations — making 
decentralization and autonomy a necessity and not just an ideal. Responsibility 
budgeting is essentially a form of internal and external contracting wherein costs of 
services to meet mission requirements are negotiated. Decision units are then held 
accountable for execution of their budgets to fulfill the commitments agreed to in the 
negotiation process. Responsibility budgeting employs explicit contracting between 
units for the provision of specific services or goods in exchange for financial resources 
for operation and capital acquisition necessary for production. The distinguishing 
elements of responsibility budgeting are (a) the evaluation of units and managers 
relative to the contract obligations they accept, (b) the use of financial and performance 
measures to reward accomplishment and sanction failure, and (c) identification and 
attribution of financial success or failure entirely to managerial decisions and employee 
performance. 
From the perspective of the environments within which public organizations function, 
in networks and alliances people work in information rich environments. However, 
access to information is not necessarily symmetrical (equally available to all). 
Decentralization works in such an environment only where elected officials (e.g., in 
Congress and the Italian Parliament, and municipal politicians in Italian local 
governments) and senior management in public organizations attend to executive 
decision and management functions including strategic planning, organizing, staffing, 
investment in the intellectual and cultural development of the organization, but refrain 
from attempts to manage the conduct of operations. This takes practice, self-restraint 
and a willingness on the part of legislators and senior management to accept the risks of 
being held accountable by citizens for results that are, to a great extent, determined by 
public managers and those working for them providing services distanced and insulated 
by management control delegation from the immediate influence of politics. This is 
asking a lot, as noted. 
For this reason, it may make sense for governments to experiment with responsibility 
budgeting using pilot projects of the type authorized under the Government 
Performance and Results Act rather than going quickly to other, more radical, new 
modes of organization and control. The same may be recommended for Italian local 
governments. Slow adaptation probably is better that attempts to convert to the new 
model quickly. One impediment that makes slower transformation almost a necessity is 
the fact that few managers in government to whom greater delegation of authority and 
responsibility is to be given under reform have had much experience with this approach, 
or with New Public Management-oriented devolution of decision making, or 
decentralization generally. Further, few elected officials and senior executives outside 
of New Zealand and other nations that have implemented reforms of this nature have 
much experience with self-restraint and management by results.  
The incentives and disincentives implicit in NPM-oriented responsibility budgeting, 
accounting and management control must be experienced and evaluated in individual 
institutional contexts. The methods outlined in this article must be adapted to the levels 
of budgeting, accounting and management control sophistication of each organization 
and level of government in which they are applied. In addition, attention must be paid to 
the fit of this approach to the political culture of the organization and government in 
which it is implemented. Leadership and politics make a significant difference in 
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overcoming bureaucratic resistance to change (Jones and McCaffery, 1997; Johansen, 
Jones and Thompson, 1997; Reschanthaler and Thompson, 1997). Experience with 
NPM in other nations teaches that slow, careful and incremental implementation, in 
contrast to rapid and comprehensive change, is more likely to lead to success in 
attempts to reform public sector budgeting, accounting and management control 
practices. Provision of empirical support for this observation is not the purpose of this 
article. However, this has been found to be the case in the United Kingdom, Australia, 
New Zealand, Sweden, other European nations and elsewhere (Jones and Schedler, 
1997). Why should we expect it to be any different for the U.S. and Italy? 
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1
 This article also distinguished between ex ante and ex post controls, a notion central to 
the exposition of budgeting for results. 
2
 This section is based on Anthony and Young, 1995. 
3
 One proposal to fix this problem is with a set of accounts similar to fund accounting 
systems used by non-profits. Departments would have one or more capital asset 
acquisition accounts. Outlays to acquire capital assets would be charged to these 
accounts that would hold assets but perform no operations. Assets held would be 
rented/leased to programs; each program account would show the cost of using assets, 
and rent would net out of department totals. Under this system, programs would buy 
their support competitively from their own department, other departments, or the private 
sector. Program outlays would approximate program costs and could be related to 
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